I predicted in my original review of TOAW that such an ambitious project would undoubtedly suffer from trying to extend its system over too great a range, since the word \"operational\" covers quite a bit of ground (from company-level actions all the way to corps). Indeed, the first few patches (and there have been several) to the original game addressed such issues as skewed road movement rates, unrealistic supply situations, and all sorts the rips and tears that result from stretching a wrap to fit so wide a bowl. Recently, there has been some controversy regarding the accuracy of the underlying engine, as some observant players noticed that in certain situations, the tactical engine was churning out some truly bizarre results, with the now infamous \"100 jeeps\" turning aside all manner of German panzers being the most ridiculous (and most harped-upon) outcome.
The scenarios themselves are everything you'd expect from a game which covers combat from 1956 to the present day. All of the Arab-Israeli wars, plus a number of NATO/Warsaw Pact slugfests (1960's and 1980's), Desert Storm, a hypothetical Korean War in the near future, and several scenarios from the Vietnam War. If it isn't in the game, you'll probably see a user-created version of it soon for download on some website somewhere. While I didn't get through every scenario in the game, I did play a number of them, and there are several (especially the NATO/Warsaw Pact ones) which would make for excellent solo and/or PBEM vehicles. In other words, I like 'em. On the other hand, the Vietnam scenarios fall under the category of things which are too unique to adequately model with a generic game system. The contrast between something like GMT's boardgame Silver Bayonet and the \"Ia Drang '65\" scenario shows just how much more there is to successful game design than just drawing a map and placing some historical units. To my mind, there will always be a place for well-designed games which take specific historical realities into account and try and depict them with imaginative rules. On the other hand, you're not going to see a lot of computer games published that way, as the market is too small. So better to have the tools to design a reasonable facsimile, yourself. Or you can, as I said, wait for someone to make one.
TOAW2 is not free from the problems which plagued its predecessor, either. One thing that struck me as being particularly odd about the game when I first played it (using v1.0) was that the theater recon didn't seem to work properly. Sure enough, the latest patch (v1.02) states that \"a number of airmobile-movement, theater-option and supply issues have been addressed\" without actually naming what they are. Supply has been a bugbear with this whole system since the beginning, and it's nice to know they're continually fixing it, even if it'll probably never be fixed. I've given up trying to figure out exactly how it works. And why oh why can I still not see a supply path traced for my units With v1.02, the game is in a state which should satisfy most wargame purists. Of course, a real purist is going to scoff at the whole idea of a modular operational-level plug-and-play system like TOAW, anyway. Those who don't scoff should enjoy the game.
Share your gamer memories, help others to run the game or comment anything you'd like. If you have trouble to run The Operational Art of War II: Modern Battles 1956-2000 (Windows), read the abandonware guide first!
The Operational Art of War (TOAW) is a series of computer wargames noted for their scope, detail, and flexibility in recreating, at an operational level, the major land battles of the 20th century. A Norm Koger design, TalonSoft published the first of the series in 1998. Matrix Games bought the rights to the franchise and created a new game in 2006, TOAW 3, which was the first non-Norm Koger designed game in the series.
The scale of the game is variable, with distances ranging from 2.5 km per hex to 50 km per hex, and each turn simulating from 1/4 day to 1 week of time, but is fundamentally \"operational\", focusing on battalion, division, and corps combat. The option of scale is left to a maker of a particular scenario to choose, resulting in a wide range of user-made scenarios; ranging from, for example, a small engagement in northern Germany between several companies to an entire World War II on division scale.
As a legion of the Grand Army of the Republic, the 501st Legion consisted of various specializations of clone troopers. Beside the standard clone trooper, the 501st deployed clone trooper pilots via its starship and ground vehicle groups, as well as clone gunners, and various clone trooper officers with a ranging degree of customized armor and equipment. The 501st had a range of specialized clone troopers that served in operational capacities, including the Clone Comms Technician who were responsible for proper communication, and Clone Engineers who were tasked with confirming that Republic vehicles were operational.
Not all isolated troops managed to escape during the spectacular evacuation from Dunkirk but they were no longer operational. They had had to leave all their heavy weaponry and other equipment behind on the beaches and there were no replacements. What followed was the battle of France which ended like it had begun: with a French government incapable of taking the initiative and resigning to German control: Vichy France.
On August 5, Erich Marcks submitted his first report to Halder, the first version of the operational plan for the east. According to this Plan Marcks, two army groups were to attack the objectives Moscow and Kiev. The largest army group (with the major part of the armored forces) was to advance on Moscow and at the same time deploy troops to capture the Baltic states and Leningrad. This secondary task should not be detrimental to the main strike towards Moscow. The southern army group was to strike in the direction of Kiev, supported by an army operating from Rumania. After Moscow had been taken, the northern army group would turn south to support the units that were to capture the Ukraine.
Facing the best army in the world was a force that in 23 years had gained stormy and turbulent organizational, theoretical and operational experiences. During the first stages of the Russian revolution, and the subsequent civil war, the Bolshevist leadership needed armed forces to defend its seizure of power. Based on voluntary participation and other willing defenders of the regime, the Red Army of Workers and Farmers was formed (RKKA: Raboche Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armia) in short, the Red Army
Due to the expansion of territory to the west, new airfields were to be constructed. In June 1941, only a few air bases were fully operational. The majority of the aircraft was still parked in the open air as there were too few hangars to hide the planes from the spying eyes of the Luftwaffe and protect them from the weather. The air bases also suffered from a huge shortage of anti-aircraft guns.
The Operational Art of War IV is the new generation of operational wargames. With more flexibility than before and with a new array of exciting features, it will make you relive the most iconic battles from the dawn of the 20th Century to modern day, including the ones that never occurred!
Since the beginning of the Russian offensive, we can distinguish two ways of conducting the war. On the Ukrainian side, the war is waged in the political and informational spaces, while on the Russian side the war is waged in the physical and operational space. The two sides are not fighting in the same spaces. This is a situation that I described in 2003 in my book, La guerre asymétrique ou la défaite du vainqueur (Asymmetric War, or the Defeat of the Winner). The trouble is that at the end of the day, the reality of the terrain prevails.
These sabotage activities do not really have an operational impact and seem more related to a psychological operation. It may be that these are actions like the one on Snake Island at the beginning of May, intended to demonstrate to the international public that Ukraine is acting.
JB: Zelensky faces the same problem as the authorities that emerged from Euromaidan in 2014. At that time, the military did not want to fight because they did not want to confront their Russian-speaking compatriots. According to a report by the British Home Office, reservists overwhelmingly refuse to attend recruitment sessions . In October-November 2017, 70% of conscripts do not show up for recall . Suicide has become a problem. According to the chief Ukrainian military prosecutor Anatoly Matios, after four years of war in the Donbass, 615 servicemen had committed suicide. Desertions have increased and reached up to 30% of the forces in certain operational areas, often in favor of the rebels. 153554b96e